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Danielle Brian-Bland and Dina Rasor*
When Congress considers Defense Authorization and Appropria-
tion bills, we assume that all those involved in the process share the
common goal of developing the most efficient military system possi-
ble for the United States. We also assume that Congress is provided
with all the necessary information about the weapons systems under
consideration, and that all the information provided is true. In fact,
Pentagon officials, including generals, are not telling Congress "the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Examining some
of the conditions that discourage them from doing so and docu-
menting cases in which the whole truth was not revealed can help us
understand why the truth so often remains untold, and can guide us
in proposing institutional changes designed to lessen the military's
propensity to mislead.
Military officials are making false statements and giving false im-
pressions to Congress, and getting away with it. There are two pos-
sible explanations for this state of affairs. One is that Pentagon
officials intentionally mislead Congress; the other is that even as
they testify before Congress on a particular project, these officials
are unaware of information with which they, as managers, should be
familiar. Regardless of the officials' intentions, however, in either
instance Congress is forced to make procurement decisions without
knowing all the relevant facts. The heavy costs of this lack of infor-
mation may range from the loss of millions of taxpayer dollars to the
loss of the lives of American military personnel.
I. Background. The Military Mindset
Before Congress authorizes the appropriation of money for weap-
ons systems, Pentagon officials testify in defense of their programs
* Danielle Brian-Bland is a Research Associate and Dina Rasor is the Director of the
Project on Military Procurement of the Fund for Constitutional Government. The Pro-
ject is a non-profit, non-partisan watchdog group that investigates waste, fraud, and
abuse in the Pentagon's procurement system. The authors would like to thank Repre-
sentative John D. Dingell and the staff of the House Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
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before congressional committees. Most of the examples cited below
are drawn from congressional hearings investigating charges of mis-
representation leveled after the making of the appropriations deci-
sions. These examples powerfully illustrate the problems which
result when Congress depends on the Pentagon for information in
making those decisions.
Three factors inherent in the military appropriations system,
while not excusing military dishonesty or obfuscation, explain why
we should not trust the Pentagon brass to regard the interests of the
taxpayer and the soldier as their highest priority. The first factor is
that military officials are not trained to think in business terms.
James Fallows, a writer noted for his work on defense issues, ex-
plains that economic self-interest is a civilian, not a military, ideal.
"A salesman advances his firm's interests by advancing his own,"
Fallows writes. "That is almost never true in the military."' Fallows
quotes a Naval Academy graduate and former marine who describes
the military as "'socialist in that the group is more important than
the individual . . [and] a meritocracy in that the ways you relate to
your unit are not based on monetary terms, but on values of per-
formance that only matter within the unit and are meaningless
outside.' "2 The highest goal in the military is thus to protect and
defend the honor of the military establishment, because it is vital
during wartime to fulfill this goal and thereby maintain esprit de corps.
The problem, however, is that this goal takes precedence over val-
ues that must be considered during peacetime, such as cost-effi-
ciency and product quality. The military mentality does not
promote business acumen, yet we require our soldiers to become
business managers between wars. As a result, we expect our mili-
tary leaders to perform a dual and conflicting role. Edward Luttwak,
a well-known military analyst, has criticized the results of this dual
role. "The military has become civilianized in the sense of emulat-
ing, at higher cost, things the civilians can do better - but not con-
centrating on the things civilians cannot do, which are to train
combat leaders, to study tactics, and to prepare strategies." 3 While
this order of military priorities does not, in itself, lead to cover-ups
and mistruths in military-civilian dealings, it begins to set the stage
for them.
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The second factor promoting military deception is that not only
do weapons system program managers have few incentives to try to
save money, but they have important incentives not to save money.
Because federal agencies, including the Department of Defense
(DoD), are unconstrained by profit and loss considerations, they
lack incentives to cut costs and increase efficiency. The power of
managers in the federal government is based not so much on their
salaries, which are standardized according to job tenure, but rather
on the size of their program budgets and the number of people they
supervise. A program manager's peers in the bureaucracy will judge
the manager on whether the program's budget is increasing every
year. If the budget increases, peers expect the manager to be pro-
moted; if it does not, they see the manager's power as waning.
Since the program managers' superiors are also judged by the
amount of money under their umbrellas of responsibility, they will
not look kindly upon any manager who does not spend all of the
money appropriated or who does not meet the program's projected
needs for personnel. The cardinal sin for a bureaucrat is to try to
return any unspent money to the public coffer at the end of the fiscal
year. The program manager therefore has a strong incentive to
spend the annual allocation and to keep as many people on the pay-
roll as possible in order to justify requesting a higher budget for the
following year.4 Inducements to cut costs are minimal, since a "[flat
[budget] means high, risk-free sales for the giant corporations, an
easy, comfortable, prosperous life for all the feeders at the procure-
ment trough, and immense economic and political power for dis-
pensers of this largesse. ' 5 When a federal agency has as much
money, responsibility, and political clout as does the DoD, the temp-
tation to spend more money is even stronger than usual. The result
is that some Pentagon officials mislead Congress to ensure the
steady flow of weapon systems appropriations.
A third factor encouraging Pentagon personnel to hide from Con-
gress the truth about procurement is the revolving door between
Pentagon officials and private defense contractors. The revolving
door refers to the frequency with which Pentagon officials in charge
of procurement decisions leave the government for lucrative jobs
with the companies whose contracts they earlier awarded and moni-
tored. Pentagon officials' expectations of such job opportunities
4. The above analysis of program managers' incentives to spend is drawn from a
more detailed discussion of the subject in D. RASOR, THE PENTAGON UNDRGROUND 137-
39 (1985).
5. A. ERNEST FITZGERALD, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF WASTE 327 (1973).
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may create an incentive to be more lenient with the contractor who
may provide their post-government livelihood.
While the revolving door creates potential conflicts of interest in
all areas of government, these conflicts are particularly evident in
the military as a result of the "up or out" method of reviewing all
personnel and the pyramidal structure of the Pentagon. As in ten-
ure decisions at universities or partnership decisions in many law
firms, when a Pentagon worker is reviewed, there are only two op-
tions: the worker is either promoted or fired. Dr. Thomas Amlie, a
retired Navy engineer now working in the Financial Management
Division of the Air Force, explained the resulting phenomenon in a
1983 memorandum:
The major problem with having a military officer in charge of procure-
ment is his vulnerability. It turns out that not everyone can make gen-
eral or admiral and our "up or out" policy forces people to retire. The
average age of an officer at retirement is 43 years. Counting al-
lowances, a colonel has more take-home pay than a U.S. Senator. At
the age of 43, he probably has kids in, or ready for, college and a big
mortgage and can't afford a large cut in his income. Besides, he is at
the peak of his intellectual powers, is emotionally involved, and
doesn't want to quit. We throw him out anyway, no matter how good a
job he is doing. Many of these officers, particularly the good ones who
have spent most of their careers flying aircraft, operating ships or lead-
ing troops, do not have the skills which are readily marketable in the
civilian sector. This nice man then comes around and offers him ajob
at 50K-75K per year. If [the officer] stands up and makes a fuss about
high cost and poor quality, no nice man will come to see him when he
retires .... 6
Defense contractors do not have to request explicitly this special
treatment, because experience tells Pentagon managers that a job
offer is far more likely to be given to program managers who have
befriended contractors than to troublemakers who have not. One
study has reported that the number of people on record who have
walked through the revolving door has increased by 491 percent be-
tween 1975 and 1985. 7 Moreover, it is estimated that this figure
represents only about one-third of the total number of people who
follow this path."
6. Internal memorandum from Thomas S. Amlie, at 3 (Sept. 14, 1983) (discussing
the possibility of procurement cost reduction) [on file with the authors and with the Yale
Law & Policy Review].
7. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Aug. 17, 1986, at 25, col. 1.
8. Id. The failure of many departing military employees to fill out the required
forms concerning future employment accounts for this underestimation.
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The factors described above are so strong that they gradually in-
fluence many program managers to ignore the evident waste and
fraud.9 The training to protect military honor at all costs, the pres-
tige associated in any bureaucracy with spending rather than saving,
and the temptation to serve a potential future employer at the ex-
pense of the current one combine to lead some military officers to
provide Congress with inaccurate and incomplete information about
weapons systems, covering up the myriad mistakes and cost-over-
runs in the procurement process. On the basis of this flawed infor-
mation, Congress determines which and how many weapons the
United States will stock in its arsenal. The result is that the United
States is buying too many overpriced and ineffective weapons, partly
because Congress does not know any better than to approve the
purchases.
II. How It's Done: Manifestations of Military Mendacity
The military uses many different methods to avoid telling Con-
gress the truth. The most obvious is the bold-faced lie. Such bla-
tant contempt for Congress is, however, rare. Bureaucratic
obfuscation-the artful use of words to create an inaccurate impres-
sion or the omission of important explanations and details-is a
technique both more common and more difficult to detect.
Whether intentionally or not, false statements are made and false
impressions are created, with the result that Members of Congress
remain in the dark. Since Members of Congress generally have only
a lay understanding of military jargon and technology (unless they
have informed themselves from other sources), they must rely on
this misleading testimony.' 0 By following several years of testimony
in which military officials have presented Congress with information
about weapons systems, the authors have come to understand how
these techniques can be, and have been, used." Clearly, Congress
is not being thoroughly informed.
9. There are also strong disincentives to blowing the whistle on fraud in the procure-
ment system. Military personnel who decide to serve the public interest by exposing
waste in the Pentagon often find themselves the subject of various forms of harassment,
ranging from having their offices moved repeatedly to being transferred to jobs without
substantive control to being fired.
10. While there are some executive agencies that independently monitor whether
contract requirements are being met - the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), the
Defense Contract Administrative Service (DCAS), and Service Plant Representative Of-
fices - these bodies often lack Congress' objectivity because of their close working rela-
tionship with defense contractors.
11. Because Members of Congress tend to be more persistent and more ruthless




A. The Bold-Faced Lie
The following are examples of the bold-faced lie. One need not
have a military background to see the falsity of the generals' state-
ments in these instances.
One instance of such outright deception occurred during a con-
gressional investigation of the Sergeant York, or Division Air De-
fense Gun (DIVAD), fiasco.' 2 Early in 1984, the Department of
Defense sent a cure notice to Ford Aerospace and Communications
Corporation when the company breached contract provisions for
both the schedule and quality control of the Sergeant York. Susan
Meyer, Contracting Officer for the DIVAD program, wrote to Henry
Hockheimer, President of Ford Aerospace, "Please let me know by
February 23, 1984 what extraordinary actions you are taking or will
take to remedy this totally unacceptable contract performance."l 3 In a
congressional hearing later that year, when discussing a Washington
Post article referring to this letter, Major General James P. Maloney
testified: "Sir, let me say first of all, the words 'totally unacceptable'
which appear in the banner [head]line in quotes are not found any-
where in that letter. ... 14 Major General Maloney made this dec-
laration despite the prominent play given the words in question in
several newspapers. 15 If military officials had not insisted on de-
fending DIVAD even as test results were proving its deficiencies,
perhaps American taxpayers would not have lost the $1.8 billion
that were sunk into the weapon program before it was finally
cancelled.
Another example of the bold-faced lie appeared in September of
1985, during testimony by Brigadier General Ronald Yates before
the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce.' 6 The occasion was an in-
often sent to testify to half-truths or worse before Congress. Thus, many of the exam-
ples that follow feature military officials of the highest ranks misleading congressional
committees.
12. Intense debate erupted over DIVAD soon after reports of its cost overruns and
ineffective performance surfaced. See, e.g., Easterbrook, DII;4D, ATLANrIc, Oct. 1982, at
29. The program was finally cancelled in August of 1985.
13. Letter from Susan Meyer to HenryJ. Hockheimer (Feb. 6, 1984) (emphasis ad-
ded) [on file with the authors and with the Yale Law & Policy Review].
14. Defense Dep' Authorization and Oversight: Hearings on H.R. 5167 Before the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 596 (1984) [hereinafter H.R. 5167
Hearings] (statement of Maj. Gen. James P. Maloney, Commanding Gen., Army Air De-
fense Center, Fort Bliss, TX.).
15. See, e.g., Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1984, at A3, col. 3.
16. Many of the examples in this piece come from hearings held by Representative
John D. Dingell (D-Michigan), who is the Chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. Rep. Dingell is one of the
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vestigation into the extreme overpricing of support equipment for
the F-16 fighter aircraft. The exchange below involves the F-16 pul-
ley puller, priced at $8,832.
Mr. Dingell: .... When the GAO [General Accounting Office, the
investigative arm of Congress] interviewed you, General Yates, you
said you did not agree with the Secretary of the Air Force's letter and
you said that the pulley puller should have cost only a few dollars and
that as soon as Air Force officials found out about the price, the Air
Force asked and received a voluntary refund; is that correct?
General Yates: That is not correct. I have never discussed, to the
best of my recollection, the pulley puller with the GAO. For sure, I
never said I disagreed with the Secretary of the Air Force.
Mr. Dingell: The GAO also informed the subcommittee you said
you did not agree with the refund and only requested it when you were
ordered to do so; is that correct?
General Yates: Sir, I do not ever recall discussing this subject with
the GAO.
Mr. Dingell: All right. The GAO also informed the subcommittee
you said that the data submitted to the Headquarters U.S. Air Force
was the same as presented to the GAO and did not support a refund
request; is that correct?
General Yates: No, sir. It is not.
Mr. Dingell: In fact, you were supposed to have said to the GAO
that General Dynamics is entitled to the refund that it made; is that
correct or not correct?
General Yates: Sir, I have not discussed this with the GAO.
Mr. Dingell: Mr. Quicksall, will you come forward, please?
Will you sit down over there on the end and tell us what are the facts
with regard to the interview of General Yates?
Mr. Quicksall [a GAO official]: The interview with General Yates
was in Dayton, OH, I think in February, and I was not at that meeting.
However, I know there are GAO people in the audience who were at
that interview-
Mr. Dingell: I gather that Ms. Nancy Kingsbury is the GAO agent?
Mr. Quicksall: Yes, sir. I believe she is in the audience.
few Members of Congress who are not afraid to confront even high-ranking military




General Yates: Mr. Chairman, may I say something?
Sir, I certainly do recall having an interview with Ms. Kingsbury. I
am sorry I have not met Mr. Quicksall before and in my comments
directed to you, I was addressing the GAO presentation here today. 17
Representative Dingell finally stated that he had been reading di-
rectly from the GAO notes on its interview with General Yates, dur-
ing which at least three GAO agents had questioned the general.
The following January, Representative Dingell was again having
troubles with the military - this time with the Navy. Representative
Dingell had been requesting a copy of the Defense Logistics
Agency's compensation study on General Dynamics. He had been
alternately promised and refused a copy of the report for two weeks.
The following is an excerpt from a January 7, 1986, letter from Rep-
resentative Dingell to John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, explain-
ing the outcome of the battle:
Bruce Chafin of the Subcommittee staff called Captain Cohen late
that afternoon [December 20, 1985] to determine if the report was on
its way. Captain Cohen informed Mr. Chafin that there was only one
copy of the report and it was in your briefcase on its way to Texas. Mr. Chafin
informed Captain Cohen that the Subcommittee would subpoena the
report on Monday, December 23. Less than two hours later, we re-
ceived a copy of the report. The Subcommittee staff is currently inves-
tigating who were the co-conspirators in Captain Cohen's lie.18
Not only did Captain Cohen go unpunished for his statement, but
Secretary Lehman never responded to the Representative's letter.
B. Clouding the Issue: Bureaucratic Obfuscation
While bureaucratic obfuscation is more difficult to detect than
outright lying, it is far more common and thus potentially more
harmful. One form bureaucratic obfuscation takes is direct contra-
diction between accounts given by different officials, or even contra-
diction within the testimony of one individual. The following
excerpts from both House and Senate authorization and appropria-
tion hearings on the DIVAD, and from the congressional investiga-
tion of F-100 engine blades, illustrate how this type of misleading
information is provided.
17. Federal Securities Laws and Defense Contracting - Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Eneigy and Commerce, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess. 112-13 (1986) (dialogue between Rep. Dingell and Brig. Gen. Ronald Yates).
18. Letter from Rep. Dingell to Sec'v of the Navy Lehman tUan. 7, 1986) (emphasis
in original) [on file with the authors and with the Yale Law & Policy Review].
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1. Contradictions
In March 1983, Major General Maloney testified before the House
Armed Services Committee that "among all of the Army programs
with which I have been in contact . . .none has been as stable as
DIVAD. The division air defense gun program requirement [stan-
dards that ensure that the weapon is an effective one] has not
changed since 1978 when it was published."' 19
In fact, however, the requirements had been rapidly changing as
they tracked the increasingly limited capabilities of DIVAD. DIVAD
had originally been intended to serve primarily as a defense against
high-performance, fixed-wing fighter aircraft (as distinguished from
helicopters, which are much easier to hit than fixed-wing fighters).
The DoD Required Operational Capability Draft of May 1974, refer-
ring to DIVAD, stated that "[t]hreat aircraft will include high per-
formance, fixed wing close support fighter aircraft, at least half of
which will have all-weather capability.''20
As preliminary testing of DIVAD proceeded, however, there were
apparently some difficulties in getting DIVAD to achieve this origi-
nal goal. Official descriptions of the purpose of DIVAD were corre-
spondingly broadened, then altered entirely. In 1978, Colonel Len
Marrella testified that "It]he primary mission for the DIVAD gun is
to provide effective air defense against attack by armed helicopters
and high performance, fixed-wing aircraft for armored, mechanized,
and infantry divisions." 21 In 1983, Brigadier General Charles Adsit
told the House Armed Services Committee, "[t]he primary air threat
to the forward area has been and continues to be the attack helicop-
ter."2 2 Finally, in 1984, Major General Maloney himself testified
that "DIVAD is designed to cope with the hovering helicopter, the
straight and level moving aircraft and any aircraft that is maneuver-
ing in a smooth curvilinear - at a smooth curvilinear rate, you
know, a predictable curve." 2 3 Because the DIVAD requirements
strayed further and further away from its original purpose, no
19. Defense Dept Authorization and Oversight: Hearings on H.R. 2287 Before the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 1 st Sess., pt. 3, at 622 (1983) [hereinafter H. R. 2287
Hearings] (statement of Maj. Gen. James Maloney).
20. Training and Doctrine Command (Newport News, VA), Dep't of Defense, Re-
quired Operational Capability (ROC) Draft, para. 3(C)(a)(l) (undated, rec'd May 30,
1974) Ion file with the authors and with the Yale Law & Policy Review].
21. Dep't of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal )'ear 1979: Hearings on S.
2571 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 4839 (1978)
(statement of Col. Len Marrella, Project Manager, DIVAD).
22. H.R. 2287 Hearings, supra note 19, at 667 (written statement of Brig. Gen.
Charles Adsit, Project Manager, DIVAD).





weapon was in fact being produced to meet the acknowledged threat
of fixed-wing fighter aircraft. In consequence, soldiers remain with-
out this necessary protection from air attack during ground warfare.
Another example of military contradiction arose in 1986, when it
became clear to congressional investigators that engine failures in
Air Force F-15 and F-16 fighter planes resulted from the practice of
repairing and reinstalling defective engine blades, rather than scrap-
ping the defective blades and installing new ones. A congressional
hearing was convened to investigate the matter. Prior to the hear-
ing, the Air Force received a letter of inquiry from Representative
Dingell, addressed to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. 24
Colonel Robert F. Raggio responded to Representative Dingell as
follows: "Since we began using Chromalloy [a subcontractor] re-
paired blades in 1980, the F-100 engines installed in our F-15 and F-
16 fleets have operated more than two million hours without a sin-
gle mishap attributable to the failure of a Chromalloy repaired tur-
bine blade." 2 5
The Air Force, however, had available to it information about
Chromalloy failures over four years before Colonel Raggio's letter
was written. Pratt & Whitney's 1982 report on an F-100 engine fail-
ure clearly stated that "[t]he fractured 1st blade was a tip repaired
blade based on remaining markings. The blade fell within the
group of blades that were repaired by Chromalloy in February,
1980."26 General Earl T. O'Laughlin, in his prepared opening re-
marks at the congressional hearing in 1986, admitted that
Chromalloy-repaired blades had failed in the past: "While our ini-
tial reviews failed to highlight any failures, the GAO discovered one
such mishap and our own additional investigations have revealed
two." 27 He did not, however, tell Representative Dingell about the
Pratt & Whitney report, although the Air Force certainly should
have had the report and should have done something to address the
24. Letter from Rep. Dingell to Sec'y of Defense Weinberger (July 14, 1986) [on file
with the authors and with the Yale Law & Policy Review].
25. Letter from Col. Robert F. Raggio, Chief, Weapon Systems Liaison Division, to
Rep. Dingell (undated, rec'd July 30, 1986) [on file with the authors and with the Yale
Law & Policy Review].
26. Pratt & Whitney, Final Report on the Teardown Investigation of F-100 Engine
P680184, § 2(n) (Feb. 17, 1982) [on file with the authors and with the Yale Law & Policy
Review].
27. Potential Flight Safety Problems of the F-15s and F-16s Resulting From the Installation of
Defective Engine Blades: Hearings Before the Subcomm. oni Oversight atd lvestigations of the
House Comm. on Eneg), and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., opening statement (Aug. 8,
1986) [hereinafter Engine Blade Hearings] (unpublished hearing, transcript on file with the
authors and with the Yale Law & Policy Review) (statement of Gen. Earl T. O'Laughlin).
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problem.2 8 Amazingly, even after this admission had been made,
General Henry Viccellio - who was in charge of the Air Force in-
quiry into the engine blades - stated during the hearing: "[W]e
have no indication that an engine blade sent to repair has failed in
any engine." 29
Whether these omissions sprang from a deliberate decision to
hide information, or whether they simply occurred through ineffi-
ciency and incompetence, is unclear.30 The result, however, is the
same in either case. If Representative Dingell had not been alerted
by an outside source (in this instance, the GAO) to a problem that
was not being resolved by the Air Force, the installation of faulty
engine blades would have continued, with serious consequences.
An engine blade that breaks within a running engine will tear
through the engine and completely disable it. The F-100 engine
blades are used in both F-15 and F-16 fighter planes. While a pilot
could land the dual-engined F-15 on the remaining good engine,
the F-16 has only one engine. It is nearly certain that if the engine
of an F-16 were disabled, the plane would be lost. An F-16 costs
between $20 million and $30 million per plane, depending on the
version built. But more important, in either type of plane the life of
the pilot would be placed in jeopardy.
Pilots' lives were also endangered by another cause of F-100 en-
gine failures. In addition to the poorly repaired engine blades, the
F-100 engine was receiving faulty "root seals" (a small part of the
engine blade containing holes allowing air to pass through). Over a
four-month period in 1983, five engines were destroyed as a result
of faulty root seals. General Henry Viccellio asserted, however, that
"[t]hose were all installed in new manufacture, sir, not at the [Air
Force] depot."3' After reading aloud for the record report after re-
port of engine failures caused by faulty root seals that had been re-
28. Colonel Raggio's letter to Representative Dingell, supra note 25, makes it clear
that the Air Force had seen "the results of periodic reviews of contracted turbine blade
repair at Chromalloy"; it is not clear, however, whose reviews are referred to. It seems
most unlikely that a report done by a major contractor such as Pratt & Whitney would
not have been sent to - and read by - those military officials responsible for managing
the items under study. See infra note 29.
29. Engine Blade Hearings, supra note 27, at 164 (statement of Gen. Henry Viccellio).
General Viccellio also stated that "[w]e participate with Pratt & Whitney ... to look at
new configurations of blades that are coming out." Id. at 158. In light of this statement
it seems probable that the Pratt & Whitney study, supra note 26, was widely read among
those officials connected with the engine blade program.
30. What is most likely, however, is that Gen. Viccellio was merely doing what a
military man should do on the battlefield, but not before Congress. He was being posi-
tive and assertive, even if he did not know the answer.




paired and installed at the Air Force depot, Representative Dingell
had the following colloquy with the General:
Mr. Dingell: General, why is it that you told me that was not a prob-
lem with depot-installed blades?
General Viccellio: Because at the moment, sir, that was the best
knowledge I had available, and basically-
Mr. Dingell: Did you know when you told me or did you not know?
General Viccellio: Did I know?
Mr. Dingell: Did you know or did you not know when you told me
this? Did you know what the truth was or were you guessing?
General Viccellio: I was passing on information that essentially
came off the top of Colonel Eickmann's head, sir.3 2
As a result of one incidence of root seal failure, an F-16 was lost and
two pilots were forced to bail out and were rescued from the Gulf of
Mexico. 33 There were no fatalities, but a pilot might not be so for-
tunate the next time.
2. Partial Truths
Another method commonly used to avoid telling the truth is sim-
ply to leave out the bad news. For example, still further problems
for the DIVAD included its inadequate lethality (the probability of
hitting the target) and its slow reaction time (the length of time be-
tween spotting the target and firing at it). On January 4, 1983,
James Finsterle, Division Director of Land Forces, wrote an internal
memorandum stating that:
Data released since the [DIVAD] 'Buy' decision shows that several
key effectiveness parameters were overstated in the information previ-
ously available to either you or Dr. DeLauer [Undersecretary of De-
fense for Research and Engineering] or, presumably, to other DSARC
[Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council] members:
-Lethality by as much as 300%
-Reaction time by as much as 4007%34
Two months later, however, Dr. Jay Sculley and Lieutenant Gen-
eral James Merryman testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee that DIVAD's design "results in extremely fast reaction
time from target unmask, and although the exact value is classified, I
can inform you that it is sufficiently rapid to engage and destroy a
32. Id. at 171.
33. Id.
34. Internal memorandum from James C. Finsterle to Mr. Chu through Mr. Christie
(Jan. 4, 1983) (discussing the possibility of reconsidering the DIVAD program) [on file
with the authors and with the Yale Law & Policy Review].
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pop-up helicopter [one which appears suddenly from behind an ob-
stacle] before it can guide an antitank missile to a target."3 5
In this example, the Pentagon officials used vague and limited de-
scriptions in order to avoid telling Congress that the Pentagon had
been operating under extremely inaccurate assumptions. Although
Finsterle's memorandum shows that there was a serious problem
with the DIVAD reaction time, Sculley and Merryman's testimony
glossed over this issue, and never revealed the unpleasant truths the
Army had discovered. 36 But for the release of the memorandum,
soldiers on the field might have believed that they could rely on the
gun under circumstances in which it could not, in fact, protect them.
One of the most blatant examples of misrepresentation about
weapons system capabilities involved "cueing," the test runs that pi-
lots of the Maverick missile ran before their missions were recorded
in the testing data. The tests were performed to determine whether
the missile's guidance system would actually "lock-on" to the target.
The pilots conducted many test runs over the target site before the
missions were recorded, although it appears that these practice runs
were not intended to be public knowledge. This example illustrates
a common method by which Congress is kept in the dark about
problems in weapons systems. The Pentagon official tries to take
advantage of Congress' limited knowledge of military jargon and
the weapon program in question by conveniently leaving out the
explanations.
During hearings on the Maverick in 1978, the dialogue between
House Armed Services Committee members and Pentagon officials
took a surprising turn:
Mr. Lloyd: .... I want this clarified Mr. Chairman. I don't think this
is apparently a very significant involvement. That's not very many
passes. They don't mean anything. How many flights or missions do
you have? You could do all that in practically one day.
Col. Martin: It is 30 missions.
Mr. Lloyd: Thirty?
Col. Martin: Yes.
35. Defense Dept Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal ) ear 1984: Hearings on S. 675
Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 1937 (1983) (writ-
ten statement ofDr.Jay R. Sculley, Ass't Sec'y of the Army, and Lt. Gen.J.H. Merryman,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition).
36. It is possible that Sculley and Merryman were unaware of the Finsterle memo.
One would hope, however, that a memo entitled "Why Not Revisit the DIVAD Deci-
sion," written by the Division Director of Land Forces and pointing out serious flaws in
DIVAD's performance, would reach the attention of high-level officials testifying about
that program before Congress.
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Mr. Lloyd: Thank you.
Mr. Ichord: Thirty what?
Col. Martin: It is thirty separate flights.
Mr. Ichord: How many total passes were made?
Col. Martin: For the active test...
Mr. Ichord: Break it down into training and passes, Colonel.
General [Alton] Slay [Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Develop-
ment and Acquisition]: It is 317 training and 215 active tests for a
total of 532 seeker activations.
3 7
Had Representative Ichord not known that there could be several
passes in a single mission, Congress and the public would never
have discovered exactly how many times a pilot flew over a target
before the flight was recorded. The missile performed poorly in this
test; as this dialogue demonstrates, the method of presenting testing
information can easily obscure such facts. Three hundred and sev-
enteen dry runs over a target before firing one shot is a luxury we
cannot expect the enemy to grant us during a real war. Pilots, as
well as ground troops, will be counting on the Maverick to protect
them from enemy tank fire from the start.
III. Solution
The first approach to correcting the problem of military lying and
obfuscation is to change the structure of the Pentagon, which now
necessitates (or at least facilitates) lying and misrepresentation.
One such structural change could be to reduce the large numbers of
military officers now involved in the procurement process,3 8 so that
fewer military personnel and more qualified civilians would be in-
volved in the actual business of buying weapons. The critical task of
determining weapon requirements would remain with the military,
but the job of buying weapons meeting those requirements would
be delegated to civilians. Since civilians working within the DoD,
unlike military personnel, are not subject to the "up or out" rule
37. Dept of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979: Hearings on H.R.
10929 Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, bk. 2, at 2220
(1978) (dialogue between Lt. Col. James Martin and Reps. Lloyd and Ichord).
38. The large number of military officers currently a part of the procurement pro-
cess is a result of the increase in the overall size of the officer corps during the 1980s.
The number of officers grew from 274,129 in September 1979, DIRECTORATE FOR INFOR-
MATION OPERATIONS AND REPORTS, DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SELECTED MANPOWER STATISTICS
FY 1979, at 12, Table P10 (1980), to 308,119 at the start of 1986, DIRECTORATE FOR
INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND REPORTS, DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY MANPOWER STA-
TISTICS DECEMBER 31, 1985, at 1, Table PiO (1986), an increase of nearly 14%. Be-
cause the number of officers on active service during peacetime remains relatively stable,
a large portion of these new officers are assigned to procurement.
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and have not been trained to give unquestioning loyalty to the mili-
tary, this structural remedy would promote cost-efficiency and prod-
uct quality.
Two measures passed at the end of the most recent session of
Congress are aimed at reducing the large number of officers in the
military and in the procurement process. The National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 198739 provides for a 6 percent re-
duction in the size of the officer corps over the next three years,40
and the conferees specifically noted that they were "concerned
about the overall size of the officer corps .... and about the dispro-
portionate growth in the officer corps in the last five years." 4' The
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1987,42 taking note
of the authorization bill's recommended reduction in the number of
active officers, provides that funding for officer pay and allowances
be cut by $77 million in the coming fiscal year. 43 While these acts
are a good start, a more drastic cut in the number of military officers
will be needed if the military's presence in the procurement process
is to be significantly reduced.
Another structural change could be to create incentives for weap-
ons system program managers to save money. If a program man-
ager finishes a program below cost, or successfully stops a wasteful
program from continuing to swallow money, that manager should
be put in charge of a larger program or be given a pay raise or a
promotion. (Of course, it would still be necessary to ensure that all
of the original standards of program quality have been met.) This
suggestion may seem an obvious one to those who are only familiar
with the commercial world, but it would cause substantial changes
inside the Pentagon.
A third structural solution could focus on the revolving door
problem. For at least two years after leaving the Department, DoD
39. Pub. L. No. 99-661, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) No. 11,
reprinted in substantially finalform in 132 CONG. REC. H 10143-221 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986).
40. Id. § 403(a), reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. H10156 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986). The
Act calls for a 1% cut by Sept. 30, 1987, an additional 2% cut by Sept. 30, 1988, and the
final 3% cut by Sept. 30, 1989.
41. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1001, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 403 (joint explanatory state-
ment of the conference committee), reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. H10143, H10312 (daily
ed. Oct. 14, 1986).
42. Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 101 (c), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.)
No. 10A, reprinted in substantially final form in 132 CONG. REC. H 10599, H 10623-53 (daily
ed. Oct. 15, 1986).
43. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Amendment No. 3 (joint ex-
planatory statement of the conference committee), repinted in 132 CONG. REC. H 10599,




procurement officers with substantial procurement decision-making
power should be barred by law from accepting employment with any
contractor with whom they had worked as government employees.
This change could reduce procurement officers' biases in favor of
particular contractors. While legislation has been passed on this is-
sue, none has been broad enough to cover all relevant officers. The
1987 Defense Appropriations Act applies a two year ban to most
middle-level officials, but it effectively exempts the high-level DoD
political appointees who actually award the contracts and set mili-
tary procurement policy.4
4
The other approach to correcting the problem of military lying is
a legal one; it entails expanding the present law to ensure that Pen-
tagon officials who lie to Congress are prosecuted and convicted.
The United States Code states:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals
or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes
any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to con-
tain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both .45
Not once has a general been imprisoned or personally fined for ly-
ing to Congress. Rather, this law has primarily been used to prose-
cute lower-level military officials who cheat on their expense
statements. Enforcement of the law should be strengthened, how-
44. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1987, supra note 42, § 931 (to be
codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2397b), reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. H 10645-46 (daily ed. Oct. 15,
1986). The ban applies to those high-level officials who perform a procurement func-
tion for one major defense system, or who negotiate contracts as a primary representa-
tive of the United States. The vast majority of high-level DoD officials perform
procurement functions for numerous defense systems, or are involved as policymakers
and as awarders (not negotiators) of contracts; thus, they do not fall within the Act's
ambit.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). This section was held to apply to misrepresentations
made to the legislative branch in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955). In
that case, the Court upheld the conviction of a former Congressman under § 1001.
(While in office, the Congressman had filed falsified records with the House Disbursing
Office.) The Court held that the legislative history of the section indicated that " 'de-
partment,' as used in this context, was meant to describe the executive, legislative and
judicial branches of the Government." Id. at 509. For similarly broad readings of
§ 1001, see United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266, 1270 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (uphold-
ing conviction for submitting false statements to a House investigative committee), cert.
denied 106 S. Ct. 62 (1985); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(upholding conviction for submitting false records to the House Office of Finance), cert.
denied 446 U.S. 982 (1980).
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ever, so that misstatements like the ones recorded in this article
would qualify for prosecution.
Another federal law that could be used to punish military decep-
tion is the prohibition against perjury, codified as follows:
Whoever -
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or
person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an
oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify
truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certifi-
cate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath
states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to
be true;...
is guilty of perjury and shall . . . be fined not more than $2,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.46
It is clear that knowingly giving false testimony under oath before a
congressional committee, where the testimony was material to the
purpose of the hearing, would constitute perjury under § 1621. 4 7
While some of the statements quoted in this article might not qual-
ify as perjury under § 1621, prosecution of those military personnel,
including generals, who do commit perjury before congressional
committees would provide Pentagon officials with a compelling rea-
son to tell the truth.
Criminal laws already on the books, though, will not correct the
problem unless the members of the Department ofJustice and other
political appointees of the executive branch are willing to prosecute
or administratively punish officials who lie to Congress. A. Ernest
Fitzgerald, Air Force Financial Management Systems Deputy,
doubts that members of the executive branch would be willing to
prosecute fellow political appointees in the DoD. As he has written,
"[w]hen did you last see the King's attorney (the Attorney General)
prosecute one of the King's men (a Presidential appointee) for do-
ing the King's business (handing out patronage)?" 48 While the De-
partment of Justice will of course have a significant role to play in
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982).
47. In Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949), the Court noted that under
the perjury provision of the D.C. criminal code (modeled on § 1621), a statement made
to a committee quorum would satisfy the requirement of a competent tribunal. Id. at 85-
86. See also Lavelle, 751 F.2d at 1271 n.4 (upholding conviction for perjured testimony
before a Senate committee); United States v. Reinecke, 524 F.2d 435, 437 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (upholding perjury conviction arising from false statements made by witness at
Senate confirmation hearing).




enforcing criminal laws against the military, the problems inherent
in executive branch self-monitoring make it crucial that Congress
and private watchdog agencies closely monitor and report instances
of Pentagon lying.
Sadly, we must recognize that some of the above misrepresenta-
tion has been uncovered during congressional hearings, and yet few
Members of Congress have done anything about it. Congressional
oversight of the DoD is meant to prevent precisely such misrepre-
sentation. Oversight, however, can be defined either as 'to monitor'
or as 'an omission or error.' Is Congress' deliberate inactivity due
to a misunderstanding about which definition of oversight they are
supposed to carry out? At some point, one must begin to wonder
how seriously Congress intends to find out the facts and fix the mis-
takes. Congress has the power and the means to change the Penta-
gon's systemic reluctance to work with the truth. Until Congress
actually wields this power, it is difficult to take congressional out-
rage over military inefficiency and overspending too seriously.
Attitudes prevailing in the Pentagon, in Congress, and even
among the public must change, so that military brass no longer awes
people into believing every Pentagon statement. Taxpayers cannot
sit back, comfortably assuming that Congress will address any de-
parture from the truth. Ultimately, the burden lies on our shoulders
to remind the Pentagon hierarchy and our congressional represent-
atives that their duty is to the taxpayer, whose money is being used
to buy the weapons, and more important, to the enlisted personnel,
whose lives depend on the quality of those weapons.
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